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RECENT DECISIONS
UNFAIR COMPETITION -

RIGHT OF PRIVACY -

USE OF UNIVERSITY'S NAME

Outlined against a blue-gray
judicial pale, the Four Horsemen rode again. In dramatic lore they are known as
Famine, Pestilence, Destruction and Death. These are only aliases. Their real
names are Abouzeid, Hajjar, Fuad and Goldfarb. Christmas Day, 1964, was widely
advertised as the day upon which football's "Fighting Irish" would suffer their
IN MOTION PICTURE AND BOOK NOT ACTIONABLE. -

second defeat of the season.' That day was the premiere of the Twentieth Century-

Fox motion picture, John Goldfarb, Please Come Home. Based on a book of the

same name,2 the film relates the plot of an Arabian king to gain revenge upon the

Notre Dame football team. The reason for the king's ire is revealed when his
varsity-robed son complains that he was not "Irish" enough to make the team.' To
secure royal vengeance, the king first forces John Goldfarb, a downed American
U-2 pilot, to coach the football team of Fawz University. Then he insists that the
State Department arrange a game with Notre Dame. To obtain the renewal of a
lease for an air base in Fawzia and to make amends for the U-2 incident, the State
Department complies, but meets the objection that Notre Dame does not play bowl4
games. After a campus meeting with a Roman-collared official of the University,
a game is finally scheduled. The team is then pictured en route to Fawzia, one
player waving a Notre Dame pennant. Uniformed in school blazers, the players
attend a banquet at the king's palace. The menu of spiced mongoose and belly
dancers is supplemented with dancing to a jazzed-up version of the Notre Dame
Victory March and films of an actual Notre Dame football game. The following
day the team, wearing authentic 1963 varsity uniforms, and shamrock-sided helmets,
meets Fawz U. Despite the obvious ill effects of the previous night's revelry,
Notre Dame maintains a lead until Shirley MacLaine 5 dons Fawzian football
garb. Amid surprised cries of "It's a broad, it's a broad!" Miss MacLaine heads
for the goal line and crosses it atop a spontaneous oil gusher. The defeat was
perhaps an augury of further futility on a battleground less steeped in the traditions of the Four Horsemen.
After learning of the film and unsuccessfully requesting that its name be

eliminated from the script, Notre Dame sought to enjoin its exhibition. The New
York Supreme Court at Special Term granted an injunction, pendente lite, holding that defendants had appropriated for commercial purposes the plaintiff's name,
symbols and reputation. 6 The Appellate Division reversed the order and dismissed
the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed upon the opinion of the Appellate
Division. 7 University of Notre Dame du lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
1 Sports Illustrated, July 20, 1965, pp. 50-60 (cover story).
2 Doubleday & Co., Fawcett Publications, Inc., and Fawcett World Library, Inc.,
were joined as defendants.
3 The sources of the facts related in this article are the briefs filed by the plaintiff and
defendants.
4 Although Father Hesburgh's name is used in the book, it is not mentioned in the motion
picture.
5 Miss MacLaine plays the role of a reporter for "Strife," an American magazine. She
poses as a harem girl to obtain an inside story on it.
6 It is an interesting question, though beyond the scope of this article, whether defendants
could be cited for contempt if they distributed the book or the film outside New York. Cf.
Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Co., 284 U.S. 448, 452 (1932), where the Court said:
The respondent could not escape the decree by removing from, or staying without, the District of Massachusetts. Wherever it might conduct its
affairs, it would carry with it the prohibition. Disobedience constituted contempt of the court which rendered the decree, and was none the less contempt
because the act was committed outside the district, as the contempt lay in
the fact, not the place, of the disobedience to the requirement.
7 An opinion was filed by dissenting Justice Burke, in which Justice Scileppi concurred.

RECENT DECISIONS
44 Misc. 2d 808, 255 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 452,
256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1965), aff'd mem., No. 93, N.Y. Ct. App., March 18, 1965.
Goldfarb focuses on a question which has concerned the courts in several areas
of the law - whether a motion picture or a book has protection as a medium of
expression although it is marketed, like any common commodity, according to the
standards and wishes of the buying public. The problem is inherent in a medium of
expression which depends primarily on entertainment value to survive. The difficulties involved become particularly acute where the film depicts a public entity.'
Notre Dame's motion for the injunction was argued upon two grounds. One
cause of action was based on an alleged violation of the right of privacy of Rev.
Theodore M. Hesburgh, President of the University, under Section 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law.9 The other cause alleged unfair competition, consisting of unauthorized appropriation of the name, symbols and reputation of the
University.
Father Hesburgh's Right of Privacy
Special Term treated the right of privacy claim in summary fashion, resting the
injunction primarily on the claim of unfair competition. However, the Court denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss the privacy claim, which raised two issues: 1)
Was the use of Father Hesburgh's personality in both the book and the film other
than incidental?' 0 2) Was the depiction of Father Hesburgh in the film actionable
even though his actual name and picture were not used?" The Appellate Division
answered both questions in the negative. Of the cases relied on for resolution of2
the first issue, the most analogous was Stillman v. Paramount Pictures Corp.'
which held inoffensive a single mention of plaintiff's name in a motion picture.'2 The court evidently chose not to follow an earlier case in New York which
held actionable14a six-second portrayal of a street peddler in a film depicting street
life in the city.
8 See Nimner, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 203 (1954). At the
time of publication the author was an attorney for Paramount Pictures Corp. See Gordon,
Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. lRv. 553 (1960).
9 The statute reads in pertinent part:
§ 51 Action for injunction and for damages
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the
supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using
his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof....
The preceding section is penal:
§ 50 Right of Privacy
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if the minor
of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51.
10 Brief for Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox, p. 18; Brief foi Defendants Doubleday and
Fawcett, p. 14. The character speaks approximately sixteen words and appears for approximately sixty seconds in the film. Reply Brief for Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox, p. 12;
Brief for Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox, p. 15.
11 Brief for Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox, pp. 10-15.
12 1 Misc. 2d 108, 147 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 18, 153 N.Y.S.2d
190 (1956). The other cases relied on were Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302,
231 N.Y. Supp. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N.Y. Supp. 773 (1929)
(single mention of plaintiff's name in 398-page book not violative of statute); Moglen v. Varsity Pajamas, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 114, 213 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1961) (manufacture and sale
of fabric partially reproducing newspaper article with plaintiff's name contained therein not
actionable).
13 Compare Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y.
Supp. 829 (1915) (plaintiff's name on sign in motion picture not actionable).
14 Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933), affirming
235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1932).
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The second issue was raised only by the film's depiction of "Father Ryan."
Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox contended that the statute prohibited only the
use of actual names or photographs.1 5 In denying this contention the lower Court
relied on Kelly v. Loew's, Inc.'6 where the plaintiffs name had been used in a book
which preceded the motion picture. In the film his name was fictionalized. The
Court held that the plaintiff was readily identifiable in view of the prior publication
of the book and held such a representation to be actionable under the law of libel."
In Goldfarb, the Appellate Division rejected the libel analogy and held the portrayal of "Father Ryan" did not meet the statutory test of identification, since the
actual name or picture was not used.' In support of this holding the Court cited
Toscani v. Hersey, 9 wherein it is stated that the privacy statute does not extend to
20
the mere portrayal of acts or events concerning a person designated fictitiously.

There was other 2authority in New York upon which the Court could have based a
contrary holding. '
In view of the conflicting authorities on the question of incidental use, Father
Hesburgh's position as a public figure may be the unmentioned reason behind the
Appellate Division's holding. As to the question of actual use, the application of
the libel rule would seem justified in privacy cases where there is injury to personal
feelings. But where this element is lacking, as it usually is in the case of a public
figure, the application of the rule would rest on a different basis. In the former
cases the interest to be protected is personal, as is the interest in one's good name;
in the latter cases it is proprietary. The troubled history of the right of privacy in
New York reflects a difference in the protection given to public figures under the
statute.22 As in Goldfarb, this factor is more often implicit than explicit.
The present statute was passed as the result of the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.H A flour manufacturer had

reproduced a photograph of an attractive young lady upon advertising posters.
These were hung in public places of varying propriety. The lady claimed damages
for humiliation, nervous shock and physical ill effects, but the Court held the com15 Brief for Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox, pp. 10-15.

16 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
17 Id. at 485, where the court said, "[t]he motion picture recited that it was based on
William L. White's book ... and that book throughout uses Kelly's true name ... ." Cf. RESTATEMENT , TORTS § 564, comment d (1938).
In the Notre Dame case, the front and back

covers for the paperback editions of the book were utilized to advertise the film, Brief for Appellee, p. 37, and Twentieth Century-Fox furnished promotional material for the book. Joint
Appendix for Appellants and Appellees, p. A 119.
18 22 App. Div. 2d at 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
19 271 App. Div. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946).
20 Id. at 448, 65 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18. Defendant's novel, A Bell for Adano, was based on

actual experiences of the plaintiff. Plaintiff contended he was readily identifiable, since he held
the same military office in the town as a fictitious character in the book. Accord, Bernstein v.
National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956) (where plaintiff was portrayed by actor who resembled him,
depiction of plaintiff's conviction and successful efforts of reporter to reverse conviction not

actionable). In Bernstein, the Court likewise rejected the libel analogy. Bernstein v. National

Broadcasting Co., supra at 833 & n.38.
21 Young v. Grenekee Studios, Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(use of manikin resembling plaintiff, a model for display purposes actionable). See Gordon,
supra note 8 at 593. See HOFSTADTER & HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY § 5.3 at 37-40
(1964) where it is stated:

"The mere change of names in connection with an appropriation for
trade will not defeat recovery if the plaintiff is readily identifiable.... Courts

have uniformly allowed recovery in both libel and privacy actions if such
identification exists regardless of the substitution of names."
Quoted in Brief for Appellee, p. 36.
22 For a complete history, see HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF
PRIVACY IN NEw YORK (1954).
23 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). See HOFSTAiDrER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 10.
There have been no amendments to § 50. Subsequent amendments to § 51 are not relevant

to the instant case. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1911, ch. 226; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1921, ch. 501.
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plaint stated no cause of action, there being no allegation of libel. 24 Perhaps because
of the suggestion of the Roberson Court,25 or the particular facts which had raised
the issue, the statutory response was
limited, prohibiting only uses "for advertising
28 ,
purposes, or for purposes of trade."
New York courts have disagreed on the interpretation to be given the statute.
Some have construed it strictly, as partly penal in character; others have given it
a broader scope as a remedial statute.2 7 Inconsistency has been apparent, 2 particularly where the plaintiff has been a public figure of some type. The statute limits
inno way the presentation of information of legitimate public interest, even though
the publisher intends to and does make a profit.2 9 In deciding cases where the type
of use was in issue, courts have often hesitated to grant relief to anyone who was
in the public eye and have often avoided the more relevant question of the legitimacy of the use itself.30 In this respect, the opinion of Justice Desmond in Gautier
v. Pro-Football,Inc.3 1 is illuminating. In that case the Court held the telecast of an
animal trainer's performance between halves of a football game not to be violative
of the statute. Justice Desmond concurred in the result but disagreed with the
majority's reasoning:
[Tihe televising of plaintiff's act was, in undisputable fact, a use thereof
"for advertising purposes," without plaintiffs consent. The performance...
became part of a long televised show sponsored by, and advertising the
product of, a manufacturer of cigarettes. But that does not end this case.
My difficulty is that there was no invasion of any "right of ' privacy." ...
[Plaintiff's] grievance here is not the invasion of his "privacy - privacy is
the one thing he did not want, or need in his occupation. His real complaint
:.. one we cannot redress under the New York "Right of Privacy" statutes,
is that he was not paid for the telecasting of his show... [Tihe intent of the
"Privacy" statutes
3 2 was to forbid and punish ...invasions of ... [the] right
to be let alone.

24 Rejecting the reasoning of the then recent article of Warren and Brandeis, The Right of
Privacy, 4 HAitv. L. Rav. 193 (1890), the Court said that no man could claim the right to pass
through life without having his picture published or personality discussed. Noting the innumerable means by which such publication could be effected, the Court refused to adopt a principle
of law based on bruised feelings, which would invite vast amounts of litigation bordering on the
absurd. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., supra at 546, 64 N.E. at 442.
25 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902).
26 N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51.
27 Compare Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup.
Ct. 1937), and Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933),
affirming 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1932) (liberal construction of statute as
remedial), with Toscani v. Hersey, 271 App. Div. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946), and Wilson
v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 73 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (strict construction of statute as
penal in part).
28 HOFSTADTER, op. cit. supra note 22 at 14.
29 Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct.1937)
(newspaper); Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d
701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963) (television program).
30 See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (see text
accompanying note 32 infra); Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 226, 171 N.Y.S.2d
223 (1958) (sordid and sensational article using entertainers' names and pictures not violative
of statute); Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 73 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (use of national
officer's name to advertise event of outlaw local organization not actionable). Compare Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963) (summary judgment not proper where historical figure portrayed on questionably accurate television program); Binns v. Vitagraph Co.
of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913) (motion picture dramatizing successful efforts
of radio operator to save ship and portraying him by name violative of statute).
31 Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952) (concurring opinion).
32 Ibid. The majority's reasoning was that the entire program was not a solicitation for
patronage, and that the plaintiff should have expected to be telecast in the status in which he
attended the game. Supra note 31, at 358-60, 107 N.E.2d at 488-89. Compare the language of
the Court in Goelet v. Confidential, Inc.:
Nor does the statute give a cause of action to those who through their
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This construction of the statute is derived from its origin. While the legislature
spoke in terms of commercial use, its intent was to prevent recurrence of the Roberson situation, i.e., injury to personal feelings.'3 Thus, in the Goldfarb ruling the
idea is implicit that the president of a university is in no position to claim any injury
to his feelings.
Although Justice Desmond's reasoning on the basis of legislative intent is persuasive, many courts have given the statute a broader scope, sometimes by using the
fiction that there were hurt feelings. An early interpretation recognized a public
figure's right to prevent indiscriminate use of his name for profit without a showing
of injured feelings.34 Later, in the leading case of Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc.,5
the Court discussed the full reach of the statute as applied to a public figure:
The rules applicable to unauthorized publication of photographs in a
single issue of a newspaper may be summarized generally as follows:
1. Recovery may be had under the statute if the photograph is published in or as part of an advertisement, or for advertising purposes.
2. The statute is violated if the photograph is used in connection with
an article of fiction in any part of the newspaper.
3. There may be no recovery under the statute for publication of a
photograph in connection with an article of current news or immediate public interest.
4. Newspapers publish articles which are neither strictly news items nor
strictly fictional in character. They are . . . used to satisfy an ever present
educational need ....
[S]uch cases are not within the purview of the statute.
There may... be liability in a case coming under subdivisions 3 and 4
if the photograph used has so tenuous a connection with the news item or
educational article that it can be said to have no legitimate relation to it and
be used for the purpose of promoting the sale of the publication.' 6

New York courts have followed these principles in subsequent cases, thus granting
relief though the facts admitted of no injury to personal feelings.37 Rather, the
application of the rules seems ultimately to have rested upon the protection of some
property right in the use of the plaintiff's name or picture.'8
own activities have become public figures....
In addition to the vast growth of the gossip columns, we find . . . detailed reports of the piquant facts in matrimonial litigation and colorful
escapades and didoes of well-known persons which are not unlike those in
the article about which plaintiffs complain.... We cannot undertake to pass
judgment on those reading tastes. The increased circulation of magazines
such as "Confidential" is mute testimony that the public is interested in the
kind of news those magazines purvey.... [IThe courts can only grant a remedy ... [under the statute] where there has been a use. . . "through a form
of treatment distinct from the dissemination of news or information."
Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 226, 228-30, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225-27 (1958).
The Goelet decision has been criticized as protecting freedom of the press to the point where
public figures are denied equal protection of the laws. Gordon, supra note 8 at 578 n.16. To
define news as whatever will sell begs the question as to legitimacy of the public interest in the
information. Consequently this type of reasoning tends to undermine the application of the
statute in any case involving a mass media of communication, whether the subject of the news
is a public figure or not.
33 HOFSTADTER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 12. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 565.

34 Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913) (motion picture

dramatizing successful efforts of radio operator to save ship and portraying him by name
actionable).
35 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (use of photo of Hindu musician
in connection with feature article in newspaper not violative of statute).
36 Id. at 782, 295 N.Y. Supp. at 388-89 (dicta).
37 See, e.g., Manger v. Kree Institute of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1956) (famous
electrolysist granted relief for use of picture and contest letter which had been altered to endorse
defendant's product); Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 866, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct.
1959) (professional model's consent to commercial use of picture not a waiver permitting sale
and advertising use of altered picture); Krieger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3
N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (use of professional boxer's name in fictionalized sports article

actionable).
38

Most of these public figure cases indicate that the defense of legitimate public informa-
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One author has discussed the inadequacy of the privacy statute to handle the
problem presented by public figures.59 Perhaps it is not so much that inadequacy
as it is a failure of the courts to distinguish the two issues involved: 1) Is the interest
to be protected personal (bruised feelings of a private individual) or is it proprietary
(as in the case of a public figure)? 2) Is the use made of the person's interest
commercial or somehow educational? Whether the interest to be protected is personal or proprietary, it has been argued that the limits of the right should be the
same for public individuals and public figures.40 If a public figure is to receive less
protection from the commercial use of his name or personality, it seems preferable
to decide cases on the sole ground that a public figure is involved, rather than to
contribute to the existing confusion surrounding the question of commercial use.
To face the question openly, as the Appellate Division in Goldfarb did not, would
at least expose to legislative or judicial consideration the factors which demand
protection for the proprietary interest of public figures in their names and
personalities.
The Action for Unfair
Competition
The traditional doctrine of unfair competition would not have afforded relief
in Goldfarb because the requisites were "palming off" one's goods as those of another or some form of misrepresentation or deception of the public. 4 1 Perhaps the
most important development in the area was the case of International News Serv.
v. Associated Press,42 which expanded the law of unfair competition to prohibit
misappropriation as well as misrepresentation. In that case the Supreme Court
affirmed a decree enjoining INS from copying or selling news obtained from AP's
bulletin boards and early editions of papers subscribing to the AP service. Holding
that substantial appropriation of the product of plaintiff's labor was actionable,

tion is unavailable where pictures have been altered or events fictionalized. But when squarely
faced with a case where no alteration or fictionalization was present, the Second Circuit expressly held that a professional ballplayer had an assignable "right of publicity" in his photograph.
Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953). In Haelan, the defendant used pictures of professional baseball players as a
promotional device in packages of gum after the plaintiff had been assigned the exclusive rights
to the picture. As in analogous unfair competition cases, to restrain such activity on the basis
of interference with contract would beg the question as to the existence of the right which is
the subject of the contract. See Developments, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 888, 936
(1964). The Haelen Court rejected some New York cases which held the statutory right of
privacy to be personal and not proprietary. Although criticized in some cases, Strickler v.
National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958), cf. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co.,
195 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1961), the case has been cited with approval in recent New York
decisions, which have extended the "right of publicity" to uses in the media of expression. See,
e.g., Spaha v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (fictionalized biography of baseball player); Myers v. U.S. Camera Publishing Corp., 9 Misc. 2d
765 N.Y.S.2d 771 (New York City Ct. 1957) (nude photograph of model in "U.S. Camera
Annual"). Accord, Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952);
Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957). In Donahue, which involved
a Utah statute similar to New York's, the Court stated: "if [the article is] fictional, it constitutes a violation . . . of the rights of public figures and private persons alike." Donahue v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., supra at 15 (concurring opinion).
39 Nimmer, supra note 8, at 210-14.
40 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 605-13.
41 1 Nims, UNFAiR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MA xs, Chs. 1, II (4th ed. 1947). The dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals asserted that Goldfarb was a clear case of misrepresentation. Citing Cornell Univ. v. Messing Bakeries, Inc., 285 App. Div. 490, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280,
aff'd, 309 N.Y. 722, 128 N.E.2d 421 (1955), Justice Burke argued that the appropriation of the
University's name would deceive the public into believing that there was some alliance between
Notre Dame and the defendants. No. 93, N.Y. Ct. App., March 18, 1965, at 8. It is important
to distinguish this argument from the defendants' contention that the name itself had an intrinsic
connection with the subject matter of the book and film so as to bring the use within the realm
of fair comment.

42 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918).
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irrespective of any deception, 43 Mr. Justice Pitney enunciated the broad equitable
principle which condemned the defendant for "endeavoring to reap where he
has not sown. ' "41 This sweeping doctrine has been enthusiastically endorsed by a
few courts, 4 5 but many have limited the INS case to its facts. 4 Of the doctrine,
Rudolf Callman has written:
The general doctrine upon which the Associated Press decision was
based is not without support in the cases before and since. Much of this support, however, is found in dictum and dissent rather than holding, and since
an unfair-competition case almost invariably presents an extremely complex
factual situation, it is inevitable that the opinions frequently differ on the
factors which actually control the decision. There is, however, sufficient
agreement to support the statement that most courts have
47 yet to extend the
law of unfair competition to prevent unjust enrichment.

The INS principle has been utilized with varying degrees of intensity in certain
types of cases. 48 Many courts have used it to underpin a tenuous holding that the
wrongful acts were within the traditional limits of the unfair competition action. 49
In cases similar to INS dealing with appropriation of news, most courts have
expressly adopted it.5" A step removed are the broadcasting cases where relief has
been afforded to competing broadcasters. 51 Some courts have dealt harshly with
those who, having obtained an item sold on the market, reproduced a cheaper
version of it. But where the object of this method of appropriation was intangible,
like a dress design or a promotional idea, relief has been available only where
deception occurred or special circumstances were present. 52 It is in these matrix
cases that precedents limiting the INS doctrine have often forced the courts to

43 Mr. Justice Holmes, concurring, stated that the grounds for decision should be the
implied misstatement by INS that the news was its own. International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248 (1918).
44 Id. at 239.
45 See, e.g., Veatch v. Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904 (D. Alaska 1953) (dictum); Samuel
Winston, Inc. v. Charles James Servs., Inc., 159 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum).
46 See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929); Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942)
(dictum).
47 2 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITrON AND TRADE-MARKS § 60.3 at 884 (2d ed. 1950).
48 See Developments, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 937 (1964). For a discussion of cases prior to INS which utilized the concept, see Callman, He Who Reaps Where
He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 H&av. L. REV.
595 (1942).
49 Callman notes that as a result of the narrow limits of the traditional unfair competition
doctrine, "we find strained applications . .. solely because relief is necessary and another doctrine is unavailable." 2 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 884 n.28.
50 E.g., Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 383,
192 A.2d 657 (1963; McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 108 Cal. App. 2d 392, 239 P.2d 32 (1951);
Contra, Triangle PubGilmore v. Sammons, 269 S.W. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
lications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942)
(dictum).
51 Compare National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955), and
Mutual Broadcasting Sys. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
with Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV,.Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), and Loeb v. Turner,
257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See Rahl, The Right To "Appropriate" Trade Values,
23 OHIo ST. L.J. 56, 63-73 (1962).
52 E.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) (fabric design);
880 Stores, Inc. v. Martinez, 227 Ore. 147, 361 P.2d 809 (1961) (promotional idea);
Glazer v. Hoffman, 153 Fla. 809, 16 So. 2d 53 (1943) (magician's act); Hughes v. West Publishing Co., 225 Il. App. 58 (1922) (system of legal research and symbols). Relief has been
available where there were special circumstances, Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d
443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956) (dress design), or
deception, Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292 (1960) (quick-draw holster design). Cf.
Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1964). Compare Fisher v.
Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921) with National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming 93 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N'Y.
1950).
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8
find deception, even where the defendant has identified the product as his own.
In contrast to these cases, entrepreneurs who have "hitched a free ride" by utilizing
54
some aspect of a business system created by another have fared well in court.
However, where such activity seriously interfered with the plaintiff's business, some
courts have acted to stop it.55
One writer has suggested that the reasoning of a leading telecasting case,
Intermountain Broadcasting & Telecasting Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 56
should be used in interpreting the application of the INS doctrine in the various
types of cases. The test is this: relief is most often granted where the effect of
the appropriation is to destroy the primary market for the value plaintiff has
created.57 The test works well when balanced with the public interest in the
dissemination of the object involved. Commercial rewards must exist as incentive
for those who create values in our society, tangible or intangible. Whether the
contributor is to enjoy a monopoly, however, must be pragmatically determined by
evaluating the effects of protection or nonprotection.5" In making this determination courts have necessarily divided as to the basis for the action of unfair competition: protection of the public interest in a free market or of the property right
of an individual to reap for himself the harvest of his labors. 5
Granting the injunction in the Goldfarb case, the Court below relied on cases
espousing the INS doctrine. Judge Greenberg first held enforceable Notre Dame's
property right in its name, symbols and good will, 6° although circumscribed by
the public interest in the dissemination of news or educational material. His discussion centered about the use made of the plaintiff's name and symbols:

[N]either the book nor the motion picture is a satire, burlesque or any
other form of literary portrayal or criticism of the University of Notre Dame
or its team.... mhe name Notre Dame and the University's symbols stand
distinct and separate from the subject literary creations, and their use can in
no way be classified as any form of art or literature, or a part thereof ...
53 E.g., John Roberts Mfg. Co. v. University of Notre Dame du lac, 152 F. Supp. 269
(N.D. Ind. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1958) (school ring); Hesse v. Grossman, 152
Cal. App. 2d 536, 313 P.2d 625 (1957) (3-D religious pictures). Contra Durlan, Inc. v. Newman, 114 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (model automobile); Braiterman-Fedder Co. v.
Cardilli, 156 Md. 699, 145 At. 338 (1920) (player piano rolls).
54 E.g., Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, Inc. v. Youth-Centre Cinderella Stores, Inc.,
215 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1954) (charge plates used for credit references and billing purposes);
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Livermore & Knight Co., 188 Fed. 696 (C.C.D.R.I. 1911)
(copy of plaintiff's envelope used for mailing advertising circulars) ; New England Tel. & Tel. Co.
141 N.E.2d
702 (Mass. 1957) (sale of advertising on plastic
v.
National
Corp.,telephone
books).
to be Merchandising
placed on plaintiff's
covers
55 E.g., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (sale
of answer book to plaintiff's physics text; some deception); Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold,
40 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (sale of solutions to newspaper puzzle contest); National
Tel. Directory Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co., 214 Mo. App. 683, 263 S.W. 483 (1924) (sale" of
advertising covers to be placed.on plaintiff's telephone directories where plaintiff himself sold advertising space on covers). Contra, Westminister Laundry Co. v. Hesse Envelope Co., 174 Mo.
App. 238, 156 S.W. 767 (1913) (relief denied where defendant appropriated word "stopurkicken" in blank advertising scheme before plaintiff proclaimed advertising scheme was his).
56 196 F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961) (community television service intercepted and
retransmitted signals to subscribers). Compare cases cited note 51 supra. See generally Note,
40 NomRn DAmE LAwYER 311 (1965).
57 Rahl, supra note 51, at 62-63.
58 Developments, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. Rlv. 888, 937 (1964). Thus in the INS
case, the ultimate effects of nonprotection would have been a severe lessening of the value of
the AP service, leading to the extinction of both INS and AP.
59 See 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 47, §§ 8, 9.
60 44 Misc. 2d at 814-15, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18. As authority, the Court cited Cornell
Univ. v. Messing Bakeries, Inc., 285 App. Div. 490, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280, aff'd, 309 N.Y. 722, 128
N.E.2d 421 (1955) (use of plaintiff's name on bread wrapper), and Trustees of Columbia
Univ. v. Axenfeld, 136 Misc. 831, 241 N.Y. Supp. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (use of plaintiff's name
by educational institute). Compare Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982
(W.D, Mo. 1912) (relief denied where defendant used college name and insignia on candy
box).
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The critical factor is that the creation, "John Goldfarb, Please Come
Home," is in no way dependent upon or logically related to the subject of
the University of Notre Dame....
The glaringly evident purpose and effect of defendants' "tacking on"
of the name and symbol of Notre Dame were to capitalize on the commercial
value such name and symbols had acquired in the minds of the consuming
public.61
The Court held the use of plaintiff's name to be outside the protection of the
public's "Right to Know," since the marketing of its8 2commercial value was the
"sole evident purpose and effect of the appropriation."
The Appellate Division reversed, saying:
It is at once apparent, when we deal with the content of a book or
motion picture, that we deal with no ordinary subject of commerce. Motion
pictures, as well as books, are "a significant medium for the communication
of ideas"; their importance "as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by
the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform .... "6 3
Analogy to the Privacy Cases

To decide the claim for unfair competition, the lower Court placed primary
reliance on unfair competition cases. In addition, the Court considered analogous
privacy cases6 4 to be quite relevant to the question: Was the appropriation for
purposes of profit or for the information of the public? In support of its holding

that commercial appropriation may take place through the medium of speech as
65
well as by other means, the Court followed principles laid down in the Lahiri case.
Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox's brief on appeal contended that the asserted
property right in plaintiff's name and symbols was, in effect, an unsupportable
claim of a corporate right of privacy6" "dressed up" as a claim for unfair compe-

tition.67
The Appellate Division did not deal with this contention explicitly. But its
rulings that a motion picture is "no ordinary subject of commerce ' 6 8 and that a
court may not judge its value as educational or informative6 9 suggest an acceptance
of defendant's contention. There is no doubt that a motion picture or book may
61 44 Misc. 2d at 819, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 222. In support of this holding, the Court cited
Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
62 44 Misc. 2d at 816, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
63 22 App. Div. 2d at 457, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
64 Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933), affirming 235
App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1932); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219,
250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
65 Relying on the privacy cases cited note 64 supra, the Court said:
That the defendants utilized the medium of speech to effectuate the
unconscionable commercial piracy of plaintiffs' property must be deemed
irrelevant. The means employed cannot change the nature of the legal wrong
perpetrated; the medium of speech cannot, even by the most potent alchemy,
transmute the legally interdicted into the judicially acceptable.
44 Misc. 2d at 817, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
66 Brief for Appellant Twentieth Century-Fox, p. 42.
67 Id. at 36.
68 22 App. Div. 2d at 457, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 306. This reasoning also supported the holding that Notre Dame had no cause of action under § 397 of the General Business Law, which
plaintiff had urged for the first time on appeal. The statute reads in pertinent part:
§397. UNLAWFUL USE OF NAME OR OTHER MENTIFICATION OF CERTAIN
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

1. No person, firm, association or corporation shall use, for advertising
purposes or for purposes of trade, the name, symbol, device or other identification of any non-profit corporation, association, society or organization organized exclusively for religious, benevolent, humane, charitable, educational,
hospital, patriotic, fraternal or veterans purposes . . . without having first
obtained the written consent of such non-profit corporation....
N.Y. General Business Law § 397. The statute provides the civil remedies of injunction and
damages.
69 22 App. Div. 2d at 458, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
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not use the name of a private individual in a fictional tale.70 In enforcing the
rights of individuals, courts have necessarily made a determination of the type
of use involved, i.e., whether it is informative or commercial. Unless the Appellate
Division's broad holding about motion pictures is taken as overruling the cases
making this distinction, it must be interpreted to mean that for some entities the
judgment may not be made. The analogy to Justice Desmond's statement in
Gautier v. Pro-Football,Inc. 1 is compelling. In Goldfarb the question as to whether
the University's name is used solely for profit or for dissemination of information
is identical to the question posed in privacy cases involving media of communication. 72 In both cases the right to protection from exploitation is circumscribed by
the public's "Right to Know." To refuse to rule on the question implies a prejudice similar to that shown towards public figures in privacy cases. The conceptual
difficulty of enforcing the right of a corporation or a public figure to "privacy"
is avoided by focusing on the real basis of the claim, the appropriation of a property
right. Again, the property right of a public entity like a university in its name and
good will may be deserving of less protection than the personal right of an individual in his name. That is one question to be decided. It is a different question
whether the Goldfarb film uses the good will value of the University's name solely
for profit. This question must be determined without regard to the former, unless
the mass media are to be allowed to use a public entity's name in any way at all.
John Goldfarb and Unfair Competition
The unfair competition case emphasized by the lower Court in deciding the
issue of commercial use was Madison Square Garden v. Universal Picture Co.7 3
The defendants in that case produced and distributed a motion picture portraying
a fictitious story, advertised to contain scenes of professional hockey games played
in Madison Square Garden (including those of the New York Rangers, owned
by the plaintiff). The films used had been taken at a game in Detroit pursuant
to a contract licensing the defendant to use them for newsreels only. The Appellate
Division held that the defendants had capitalized "for their own profit the valuable
good will plaintiff had created for the 'Rangers.' ,4
There is no doubt that the Madison Square Garden case presented- a more
blatant case of commercial piracy than does the Goldfarb film. The commercial
value of the use, especially in view of the inherent attraction of actual game films,
was greater than any educational or artistic value attached to such use. In Goldfarb,
the Appellate Division distinguished the Madison Square Garden case on the
grounds that no actual game films were used by Twentieth Century-Fox. 7 5
This factor is relevant in determining the commercial or good will value of
the offending scenes in Goldfarb. But the total effect of the appropriation, in addition to this one factor, must be considered.
70 See cases cited notes 29 & 30 supra.
71 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952). See text accompanying note 32 supra.
72 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 610 n.228. The same question also seems to be presented
by any case under § 397 of the General Business Law. See note 68 supra. The Appellate
Division, however, ruled that the statute was "mainly designed to operate in connection with
the sale of goods and services" and that "a situation like the present was remote from the legislature's contemplation." 22 App. Div. 2d at 456, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305. The dissent in the
Court of Appeals noted that the language of §§ 50 & 51 was adopted for § 397 so as to incorporate the cases interpreting the privacy statute. No. 93, N.Y. Ct. App., March 18, 1965, at
10-11. If the thrust of § 397 is to be limited (as the privacy statute has been in the case of
public figures), it seems that the determination should rest upon the proprietary nature of the
rights involved, rather than the type of use. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
73 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1938). See also cases cited note 64 supra.
74 Id. at 463, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
75 22 App. Div. 2d at 456, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305-06. The Court made no mention of the
actual game film shown in the banquet scene: There is no statement of the duration of the scene
in the briefs of either party, so it may be assumed that the use was inconsequential.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The Privilege of Satire
In Goldfarb the good will appropriated did not result from actual game films,
but included other elements, although intangible, used in the Madison Square
Garden case. It does not follow that the commercial value of the appropriation
is any less or nonexistent.
Once found to exist, the commercial value must then be considered in relation to the public interest in whatever artistic effect the appropriation may have.
Undoubtedly, there is an overriding public interest in satirization or fair comment,
however good or bad, concerning Notre Dame or its football team. The question
of the literary merit of a satire, however, is separable from the question of the
existence of any satire or commentary at all. To the question whether the use of
the University's name was solely for profit, it is no answer to say: "It is fundamental
that courts may not muffle expression by passing judgment on its skill or clumsiness,
its sensitivity or coarseness; nor on whether it pains or pleases. 6 The defense
presents a difficult question. 7 The privilege of satirization is quite different from
the privilege of one to present news or nonfictional educational material. Repeated
holdings that there is a commercial use whenever the treatment of a public figure
is fictionalized's are not applicable, since satire is within the scope of fair comment
even though fictional in form. The existing copyright cases on the privilege of
satire or parody are helpful but not determinative. The rule there stated is that a
satirist may use as much of the copyrighted material as necessary to enable his
audience to identify the subject of the satire.79 But the defense may not be invoked
where the taking is to satisfy the demand for the original work. 0 The material
appropriated in a copyright case is easily identifiable and subject to comparison
with the parody or satire.81 Where the subject of a satire is a public figure or
institution, however, such a comparison is impossible. And a consequent determination as to the necessity of the appropriation becomes more difficult.
Notwithstanding the contentions of Notre Dame and the conflicting statements of the defendants, the treatment of Notre Dame in the film is arguably
satire 8 2 Therefore the Appellate Division was probably right in reversing the
injunction. But to dismiss the action denies plaintiffs opportunity to prove that
the treatment was not satirical in either purpose or effect. Such determination
may not be proper for preliminary proceedings but ultimately must be made. 3s
The only alternative seems to be that the defense may be used as a "talismanic

76 22 App. Div. 2d at 458, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
77 Ia the lower Court, Twentieth Century-Fox contended that the plot had no intrinsic
connection with the University of Notre Dame. 44 Misc. 2d at 818, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 221. Evidently the claim was made to defeat any claims of deception.
78 These cases are authority for thc proposition that a newsworthy figure's name may not
be used for trade purposes. They do not discuss the proposition that a fictional form does not
obviate the privilege of fair comment insofar as the substance of the work is concerned. See
cases cited note 29 & 30 supra.
79 See Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379

U.S. 822 (1964).

80 Hill v. Whelan & Martell, Inc., 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
81 See, e.g., Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137
F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
82 For example, the reasons given for the rejection of the king's son by the football team,
i.e., he was not Irish enough; or the statement by "Father Ryan" that Notre Dame does not
play bowl games. Perhaps it could be argued that use of Notre Dame in the plot is to satirize
the participation by an academic institution in large-scale athletics or the cultural graces possessed by members of the football team.
83 Cf. Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
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literary sword by which . .. movie producers and publishers may cut down all
protection of the personal and property rights of others." 4
In other areas of the law, courts have distinguished informational and educational uses of language from cases where the use was primarily for profit. The
Supreme Court has held that commercial advertising when ingeniously linked
with the dissemination of public information is not for that reason saved from
regulation or even total prohibition. 85 The test used by the Court in obscenity
cases presupposes a similar willingness to evaluate the language used: "[W]hether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."' 8 In commenting on the Model Penal Code, Professor Schwartz observes that obscene
literature is proscribed as a "disapproved form of economic activity."' t Regardless
of the reason for this regulation, it is clear that in our legal system courts are
under a duty to make prudential judgments concerning literary or filmed productions. Determining whether Goldfarb is satirical is no more difficult than determining whether Tropic of Cancer is obscene. It is relevant to ask whether a court
should make this determination in order to extend the equitable doctrine of INS
to protect a public institution.88
Conclusion
In criticizing the courts' treatment of the INS doctrine, Calman states that
rules regulating competition cannot be the same as those governing men at peace
with one another. As long as this is borne in mind, "there is nothing in the competitive relationship making it incapable of being governed by law.""9 An extension of this idea is applicable to analyze a case where the appropriation is made
from a noncompetitor. The rules applied in unfair competition cases between
competitors (most of the unfair competition cases) have been derived from the
relation of commercial combatants. Whether they seek the same buyers or not,
society's interest demands great freedom to promote efficiency and better products.
Certain degrees of noncompetitiveness may be ascertained. For example, two radio
84 Brief for Appellee, p. 46. The Appellate Division ruled that to grant an injunction in
Goldfarb "would outlaw large areas heretofore deemed permissible subject matter for literature
and the arts," namely, the college novel. 22 App. Div. 2d at 457, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 306. If Goldfarb is conceded to be satirical, the statement is not to be doubted. But the statement is no
rebuttal of the contention that the University's name was simply "tacked on" for marketing

purposes.
85 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The defendant had, on one side of an
advertising circular, printed information of public interest. In upholding a conviction under an
ordinance prohibiting distribution of advertising handbills in the streets, the Court held:
The respondent contends that, in truth, he was engaged in the dissemination of matter proper for public information, none the less so because there
was inextricably attached to the medium of such dissemination commercial
advertising matter. The court below appears to have taken this view, since
it adverts to the difficulty of apportioning, in a given case, the contents of
the communication as between what is of public interest and what is for
private profit.... mhe stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular was with
the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance.
If that evasion were successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral
platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's command.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, supra at 55. Accord, Beard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951) (statute prohibiting door-to-door peddling upheld as applied to magazine salesman).
86 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (emphasis added).
87 Schwartz, Moral Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. Rav. 669, 677

(1963); see generally Note, Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey - 1963-1964,
39 NoTaRE DAMEn LAWYER 427, 471-72 (1964).
88 This question is also relevant to the wisdom of applying § 397 of the New York General
Business Law to cases involving books or motion pictures.
89 Callman, supra note 48, at 601-02.
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stations one thousand miles apart may not be competitors. 0 The relation between
buyer and seller is noncompetitive in a different sense. And far different is the
relation between the potential buyer and one who chooses not to sell something
of value. Before applying rules based on one relational concept to a distinguishable
set of facts, both the analogous and differentiating factors should be considered.
The primary market test of the Intermountain case seems to work well in
most instances where economic entities are involved. 91 It becomes somewhat less
reliable as the parties involved become more noncompetitive. 92
The nonseller-potential-buyer relation between the parties in Goldfarb is not
found in most of the unfair competition cases. There is an extreme degree of noncompetitiveness. Moreover, the relation is different in kind because the relation
is not based on economic factors. The role in society of the nonseller is education;
profit-making is desirable only as a means to the attainment of that end. The role
of the defendants, the potential buyers, is dual: the cultural advancement of the
public through books and films, and profit-making through those endeavors. The
duality of this role is more apparent than real, however. A realistic assessment
of the economic pressures on those involved in the entertainment media reveals
the incompatibility of the two roles.
In determining the law which is to flow from this relation, the values of the
protection of primary markets, more efficient production, and the avoidance of
monopoly are not very helpful in finding and protecting the best interests of society.
The educational purpose of the University of Notre Dame, like that of any university, is adversely affected by commercial uses of its name and good will. Prestige
is essential to obtaining good students and faculty members, to obtaining foundation grants, to insuring that its graduates obtain good jobs. Dilution of that prestige
is inevitable if it may be used by others for purposes of profit. Even if the depiction of a university is favorable, there is a consequent dilution of the good will value
of its name. More important, there is destruction of control over the means used
to gain and maintain prestige. Those charged with the administration of a university are best able to judge when and in what manner its name should be used
to advance its prestige. On the other hand, protection may or may not adversely
affect the public interest in better books and motion pictures. Even where the
use of a university's name is admittedly commercial, there may be a redeeming
value in promoting the economic welfare of the entertainment media.93
In determining the law to be applied to a given set of facts, courts often
demonstrate a sensitivity to relational concepts like the one implicit in Goldfarb.
The Supreme Court, which enunciated the equitable doctrine that one may not
reap where he has not sown, noted that the basis of the legal principle was unjust
90 See discussion of this factor in cases cited note 51 supra.
91 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
92 In the buyer-seller relation, where the buyer appropriates something from the seller and
then becomes a direct competitor, the test produces good results. The public interest in better
products and more efficient production is served unless there is deception or the destruction of a
primary market. Where the buyer never becomes a direct competitor, the test may or may not
be efficacious. Freedom of appropriation may or may not result in a better product. It may
also reduce the incentive to a point where the public suffers unless protection is granted. For
example, a professional musical organization may sell television rights to local stations. The
interception and rebroadcast of the signals by a network does not necessarily interfere with
either the musical group's attendance or the local station's audience. There is no problem of
deception. To permit appropriation here is arguably of some benefit to the public. But the
cash value of the network rights does not accrue to the musical group and thus can never be
used to improve its product. The social cost of protecting the musical organization in this situation would seem to be less than in the case of competitors.
93 It is possible that protection for Notre Dame in Goldfarb would ultimately redound to
the benefit of the motion picture industry. Protection in cases like Goldfarb and in similar
cases involving public figures would result in certainty of exclusive contracts for the use of their
names and good will value. In this connection it is well to note that Columbia Pictures once
had a contract of this type with the University of Notre Dame.
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enrichment. 94 The moralistic language of the cases in the INS line, the use of
phrases such as commercial pirate or parasite, reflects the broad moral basis of the
doctrine. But, just as in the law of unjust enrichment, the moral basis of an action
does not prevent the formulation of concrete legal principles based upon the relation of the parties in specific cases. That the courts have utilized relational concepts
in developing principles applicable to cases of unjust enrichment is evidenced by
the denial of recovery in cases where the plaintiff acted officiously, or without a
reasonable expectation of pay, or where no substantial benefit was conferred upon
the defendant. Some unfaii competition cases have also recognized the importance
of the relation where one of the parties was engaged primarily in a noneconomic
endeavor. Dicta concerning the prestige due to educational institutions has no
raison d'etre in these cases other than to support, on relational grounds, the application of traditional unfair competition doctrines. 95
Neither the lower Court nor the Appellate Division discussed defendants' contention that injunctive relief in Goldfarb was an unconstitutional interference with
the protection afforded to mass media by the First Amendment. The contention
seems to be answered in the determination of the major issues in the case. If the
use is commercial, freedom of speech is not involved. If the use is satirical or
within the realm of fair comment, it is protected. In determining the nature of
the use, any doubts raised by the First Amendment would have to be resolved in
favor of the defendants. The freedoms granted by the First Amendment are limited
by substantial public interests, such as the protection of public morals and personal
reputations. The social importance of preserving the integrity and prestige of
educational institutions is an equally important demand on those charged with
development of law to meet changing conditions. Whether or not Goldfarb was
an appropriate case in which to grant relief, it was incumbent upon the New York
courts at least to balance the precise social interests involved in reaching any
decision.
Joseph P. Della Maria, Jr.

ASHBACKEfR DOCTRINE CANNOT BE
AVIATION ADmIsNTRATVE LAw On
ExTcENDED TO COMPETITION BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DoileasTic AIRLINES. -

August 8, 1961, the Civil Aeronautics Board, on its own motion, initiated an investigation of American air routes to South America (commonly referred to as the
"Route Investigation").' At that time the Board tentatively stated that it felt public
interest necessitated but two American carriers handling the South American traffic.
Prior to the investigation, three airlines - Braniff, Pan-American and Panagra had been serving South America; Panagra and Braniff had been flying identical
routes. Appended to the Board Order was a suggestion that one carrier be designated to serve the Braniff and Panagra route and that the route itself be extended
to include Miami and New York. This investigation was scheduled to commence
on January 26, 1965.
Almost three years after the issuance of the Order, the German airline,
Lufthansa, filed with the CAB an application based on a German-American bi94 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918).
95 See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. Messing Bakeries, Inc., 285 App. Div. 490, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280,
aff'd, 309 N.Y. 722, 128 N.E.2d 421 (1955); John Roberts Mfg. Co. v. University of Notre
Dame du lac, 152 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ind. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1958). Compare Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. '786, 101 N.Y.S.2d
483, (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
1

CAB Order E-17289 (1961).
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lateral treaty2 for an extension of its route to cover a portion of the same route
flown by the American carriers.
Because of this new competition for allegedly overcrowded air routes, the
American carriers petitioned the CAB to consolidate the Lufthansa application with
the pending South American investigation, thereby giving the four airlines an Ash-

3
backer hearing. The American lines grounded their request on the treaty provision
requiring the foreign4 carrier to qualify under the laws and regulations normally
applied by the CAB.
5
After a denial of this petition, the American airlines sought review of the
of Columbia. Jurisdiction was
Board Order in the Court of Appeals for the District
6
based on § 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act.
Held: petitioners were not entitled to an Ashbacker hearing, and thus the
Board Order remained interlocutory and nonreviewable. Braniff-Pan-AmericanGrace Airways v. CAB, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2226, petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L.

WEEK 3247 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1965) (No. 824).
As the facts indicate, the procedural issue involved was of almost equal impor-

jurisdiction
tance with the substantive claim of right to an Ashbacker hearing. If
7
were to obtain at all, it would have to be based on § 1006 of the Act. Respondent
s
initially attempted to bring this case within the exception to this jurisdictional pro-

(the issuvision, i.e., that the ultimate decison in the proceedings before the CAB
9

ance of a permit to Lufthansa) would be reviewable by the President.
To this, petitioners countered with a seemingly more realistic argument - the
exception does not pertain to every order of the Board, but only to the ultimate
order.' 0 In effect, petitioners urged a literal reading of the statute so that an order
2 Air Transport Agreement and Related Exchange of Notes Between the United States
of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, July 7, 1955, 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 527, T.I.A.S.
3536 [Hereinafter cited as: United States-German Treaty].
3 Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). In the Ashbacker case, the Court
was faced with the question of whether an applicant for a construction permit under the Federal
Communications Act is granted a proper hearing where the Commission, having before it two
applications which are mutually exclusive, grants one without a hearing and then sets the other
for hearing. The Court held that where two applications are mutually exclusive, the grant of
one without a hearing to both deprives the loser of the opportunity of a fair hearing. Because
one was granted the license and the other merely set for hearing, the other would receive in
effect only a hearing for revocation or modification of an outstanding license. This placed upon
the applicant a greater burden of proof than if the hearing had been held before the issuance
of a permit.
4 United States-German Treaty, supra note 2, at Art. 3.
5 CAB Order No. E-20794 (1964).
6 Sec. 1006 [72 Stat. 795, as amended by 74 Stat. 255, 75 Stat. 497, 49 U.S.C. 1486
(1958)]:
(a) Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator under this chapter, except any order in respect of any foreign air
carrier subject to the approval of the President as provided in section 801
of this Act, shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals of the United
States or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upon petition, filed within sixty days after the entry of such order, by any
person disclosing a substantial interest in such order. After the expiration of
said sixty days a petition may be filed only by leave of Court upon a showing
of reasonable grounds for failure to file the petition theretofore. [Emphasis
added.]
7 See, note 6 supra.
8 Brief for Respondent, p. 17.
9 Sec. 801 [72 Stat. 782, 49 U.S.C. 1461 (1958)]:
The issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation, suspension, or
revocation of, and the terms, conditions, and limitations contained in, any
certificate authorizing an air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air
transportation, or air transportation between places in the same Territory
or possession, or any permit issuable to any foreign air carrier under section
402, shall be subject to the approval of the President.
10 Brief for Petitioner Braniff, pp. 24-26.
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of the Board denying consolidation, not in itself subject to Presidential approval,
would not defeat jurisdiction. The strategy presupposed that jurisdiction would
automatically attach if the order in question did not fall into the statutory exception.
The Court, however, avoided this issue (except in Judge McGowan's dissent)
and instead relied upon established precedent in the. area.- Since the Board Order
was not dispositive as to the ultimate question of whether Lufthansa's application
would be approved, the Court would consider the order interlocutory and nonappealable unless it met certain judicially formulated criteria.
Following the procedure of its earlier Ashbacker decisions, the Court once
again returned to the standards laid down in United States v. Los Angeles & Salt
Lake R. Co.12 and decided to weigh the merits of the Ashbacker request - if
petitioners were entitled to consolidation, then this would be a right denied by the
Board and its Order would then be subject to appeal. Only after deciding the
substantive question that petitioners had no claim to the hearing did the Court feel
justified in dismissing for want of jurisdiction.
As a method of procedure, this weighing of the merits, i.e., the right to the
consolidated hearing, merely to determine jurisdiction in this kind of case seems an
unnecessarily complicated way of arriving at the determination petitioners sought.
No real purpose is served by the lengthy and expensive oral and brief arguments over
the jurisdictional matter. Petitioners have presented an important question for
review, one that can have substantial adverse economic effects if decided against
the American airlines. Consequently, the quickest and least expensive procedure
for arriving at the determination of right to a consolidated hearing would appear
to be the most desirable in this type of case. The Board Order could easily be construed by the Court as a final order under the Los Angeles & Salt Lake standards,
for it did deny a right to the petitioners - the right to an Ashbacker hearing.
Further, if the Court refused to read the Order as final, there appears to be
substantial justification for review as an interlocutory order; such justification is
apparent in the theory underlying the general prohibition against review of interlocutory orders.
Interlocutory appeals [generally] add to the delay of litigation. This
delay can be justified only if it is outweighed by the
advantage of settling
prior to final decision an important issue in the case. s

Certainly a claim of right to a consolidated hearing is just such an important issue
in the case. The CAB had already suggested the elimination of one American carrier
from the South American traffic, but this suggestion was contingent upon the facts
to be gathered from the lengthy Route Investigation. The possibility exists that the
evidence may permit all three to carry on their carriage over these routes. However,
if the German application is granted before completion of the Route Investigation,
one or possibly two American carriers may be eliminated from competition without
ever having the effective opportunity of a consolidated hearing to rebut Lufthansa's
application for extension of its present route.
Turning from the procedural to the substantive issue involved, the Court was
faced with a problem of first impression - whether Ashbacker should be extended
11

In Western Air Lines v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545 (1950), this same Court held that:
This section, § 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act, does not authorize
Courts of Appeal to review an interlocutory order since an administrative
order is not reviewable unless and until it imposes an obligation, denies a
right or fixes some legal relationship as a consummation of administrative
process.
This rationale, taken from the early case of United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co.,
273 U.S. 299 (1927), had been used in 1956 in defeating jurisdiction in a similar request
by domestic airlines for an Ashbacker hearing for their respective applications. Eastern Air
Lines v. CAB, 243 F.2d 607 (1956).
12 Ibid.

13
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to permit consolidation of applications for the same route under Sections 401 and
402 of the Federal Aviation Act.14
Prior to this decision, it had been well established that when two or more
domestic lines were competing for a mutually exclusive air route, the CAB was
required to provide the consolidated hearing necessitated by Ashbacker.5 This problem was most carefully considered in Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 6 the landmark case
in aviation law involving Ashbacker claims before the CAB. There the Court determined that Ashbacker required that where the applications of two qualified airlines
are, as a matter of economic fact, mutually exclusive each applicant is entitled to a
comparative hearing and consideration with its adversary. The Court further determined that the Board had a choice of three procedures when applications were
alleged to be mutually exclusive and when such claims were not insubstantial:
1) set for hearing and then decide the issue of exclusivity as a preliminary issue;
2) proceed to a comparative hearing immediately upon the two applications; or 3)
set for hearing and then decide both the merits of the applications and the issue of
exclusivity.' 7 Any other procedure, the Court intimated, would violate the petitioners' rights to due process.
Since the Delta decision, the Ashbacker requirements therein defined have been
followed without substantial modification. Later cases emphasize that Ashbacker
cannot be used merely for tactical purposes,' but that the claim should have a
reasonable prima facie basis.' 9 Further, these cases seem to adhere to the definition
of mutual exclusivity announced in the first Delta case, i.e., that the routes must be
mutually exclusive as a matter of economic fact. Noneconomic considerations seem
to play no important role in these contests between domestic airlines.
Although this is the first instance where such a Board Order was appealed,
there are three prior cases in which similar requests for consolidation for foreign and
domestic applications have been denied by the CAB. 0 Each of these cases involved
an application by a domestic carrier for a consolidated hearing with a foreign
carrier and in each consolidation was refused on the ground that the issues involved in the two classes of applications were unrelated. These precedents served
as adequate authority for the refusal of consolidation in this case.
Instead of focusing its attention on the issue of the economic exclusivity of the
applications, the Court chose to ground its decision on the policy considerations
underlying the two classes of applications. By so doing, the Court appears to have
recognized that economic exclusivity, the only practicable test to apply to competing
domestic airlines, is not the only one pertinent to domestic-foreign competition.
An application of a foreign airline, pursuant to a bilateral treaty, raises a
number of noneconomic considerations. According to the provisions of the Federal
14 Sec. 401 [72 Stat. 754, as amended by 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. 1371]:
(d) (1) The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any
part of the transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the
[domestic] applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation
properly, and to conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board hereunder, and that such transportation is required by the public convenience and necessity; otherwise such
application shall be denied.
Sec. 402 [72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. l172] (b). The Board is empowered to issue such a permit
if it finds that such [foreign] carrier is fit, willing, and able properly to perform such air
transportation and .to conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and
requirements of the Board hereunder, and that such transportation will be in the public interest.
15 E.g., Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (1955); Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 275 F.2d
632 (1959).
16 228 F.2d 17 (1955).
17 Id. at 22.
18 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 243 F.2d 607 (1956).
19 Delta Air Lines v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632 (1959).
20 CAB Order No. 5214 (1946); CAB Order No. E-515 (1947); CAB Order No. E-5224
(1951).
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Aviation Act2 ' applications by foreign carriers shall be disposed of "as speedily as
possible." Upon learning that the Court of Appeals had stayed the Board Order
denying consolidation, Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed his fears in a letter
to Attorney General Robert Kennedy that if consolidation were granted, "the result
would be to postpone the hearings on Lufthansa's application for at least two
years." 22 Such a delay would
severely compromise our international aviation relations and will impair
our ability to negotiate effective exchanges of air routes with other countries.
Doubt would be cast on our reliability in complying with the obligations set
forth in our bilateral agreements; the value of route grants by the United
States to foreign carriers would be significantly reduced; and the operations
of our carriers over routes granted by foreign
countries would be subjected to
23
dilatory and other retaliatory measures.

Since we have a "network of bilateral agreements with over 50 countries, each one
reflecting a delicately balanced exchange of economic benefits, we should be careful
not to upset these balances."-24
The same fear of retaliatory 'action by foreign governments against American
airlines prompted Pan-Am, TWA and Seabord World Airlines to submit briefs as
intervenors, all urging the Court that the Ashbacker doctrine has no place in a consideration of route applications by a foreign line. They pointed out that it has been
the consistent policy of the United States in interpreting bilateral treaties of this
kind to allow the foreign government concerned to designate the specific points
which it desires to serve.25 Any other view, they contended, would have repercussions under similar treaties when domestic airlines seek foreign approval for route
expansions or modifications.
Another objection to consolidation that seems to have weighed heavily with the
Court was the substantial political intent expressed by Congress in passing the Federal Aviation Act. Unlike domestic certificates issued under § 401 of the Act,
foreign permits are issued under a separate provision of the Act and are subject to
Presidential approval. From this statutory separation, the Court concluded:
[Tihe obligation of the Board as an agent of the United States in connection with Lufthansa's application involves Presidential consideration of
our international relations with Germany as they arise with respect both to
Lufthansa and American domestic carriers operating abroad. Such considerations are not involved in the application of petitioners, though the route
sought by them and Lufthansa may be the same26and the competition of each
may be affected by the operations of the other.

In this same vein, the Court seemed to rely on the underlying motif of past CAB
cases involving Ashbacker claims - that consideration of competing domestic
carriers under § 401 of the Act centers primarily around economic factors. But
when an application of a foreign carrier is made pursuant to § 402, something more
than economic determinations must be made. Therefore, the Court reasoned:
In the Lufthansa case, comparative considerations, bearing primarily
upon economics, would do little to dilute the public interest factor which
perhaps weighs most heavily, that is, the policy
and obligations of the United
27
States set forth in the bilateral agreements.

By so holding, this Court rejected petitioners' suggestion that the "public interest" standard stated in § 402(b) is identical to the "public convenience and
necessity" standard of § 401(d) (1) for the disposition of domestic applications.
Under this analysis, a comparative hearing would be inappropriate, for the considerations under the two standards are different.
21 Sec. 402 (d) [72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. 1372 (1958)].
22 Brief for Respondent, p. 45.
23 Id. at 46.
24 Id. at 47.
25 Intervenor Brief for Pan Am, pp. 3-4; Amici Curiae Brief for TWA and Seaboard,
p. 5; cf. British Overseas Airways Foreign Permit Amendment, 29 C.A.B. 583 (1959).
26 Braniff-Pan-American-Grace Airways v. CAB, Nos. 18671, 18672, D.C. Cir., Oct. 30,
1964, p. 7.
27 Id. at 8.
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Having based its opinion on the divergence of considerations and the consequent futility of a comparative hearing, the Court avoided the issue of whether
mutual exclusivity - in an economic sense - actually existed. In point of fact, this
appeared to be an unconvincing part of petitioners' case, and perhaps the ultimate
decision would have gone Lufthansa's way even if exclusivity were the main issue.
At the time of the Route Investigation, the Panagra line was certified to serve over
thirty points in South America, and Braniff ten.28 The application for extension of
its route by Lufthansa involved only four of the same points served by Panagra and
two by Braniff.2 9 If this Court would have decided to judge the American and
Lufthansa application solely on the basis of economic exclusivity, it could have held
that the actual economic competition was too insignificant a factor to warrant a
comparative hearing.
Because of the seemingly insignificant character of the economic competition,
this apparently was not the ideal case for a test of the proposition that the Ashbacker requirement should be extended to include contests between foreign and
domestic airlines. Given a case where a Board decision favorable to the foreign
carrier would necessarily exclude - in an economic way - American competitors
interested in making a profit, the Court may be persuaded by the arguments advanced in the instant case by dissenting Judge McGowan. He recognized the fact
that "our international relations are a highly important factor for the Board to take
into account under Section 402. But it is not the only one, nor is there to be attributed to it, in my view, the almost overpoweringly dominant role contemplated by
the majority opinion."30 This conclusion that policy considerations are not the only
factor to be considered is readily admitted by the CAB. The Board itself confesses
it is not required to recommend to the President that a permit be issued to a foreign
applicant merely because a bilateral treaty exists. Instead, it considers that the
existence of a bilateral agreement represents a prima facie public interest
factor pointing to the grant of the application of the carrier designated by
the foreign government to operate the route, and a strong showing would be
required to warrant a recommendation to the President by the Board3 that
the application should be denied and the bilateral (treaty] denounced. '

It is with the opportunity to make this "strong showing" that McGowan is
concerned. He maintains that requests by domestic carriers as against foreign lines
are necessarily made with a realization of the great burden of persuasion that must
be made. They seek only a fair hearing, and the only kind of fair hearing possible
is one in which the petitioners get "the opportunity to mount the attack on a scale
commensurate with the barrier to be breached.13 2 By denying petitioners an Ashbacker hearing, the CAB necessarily destroys the one and only chance for just such
an "attack."
The Board . .. does not intend to afford the petitioners an opportunity
to make the affirmative case in support of their own applications until after
its recommendation with respect to Lufthansa has gone to the President. By
the time the Board hears, decides, and makes recommendations to the President with respect to petitioners' applications, the additional service provided
by Lufthansa may be the last straw on the economic back which compels the
determination that the market will not
Board to effectuate its preliminary
support both Panagra and Braniff.33
On final analysis, one finds that McGowan's dissent raises, perhaps futilely,
some fundamental objections to an otherwise convincing argument of the majority.
It certainly cannot be denied that the time factor in adjudication of foreign applications is vital; even the slightest delay in approval or rejection could give rise to
28
29
30
1964,
31
32
1964,
33

Brief for Respondent, p. 30.
Ibid.
Braniff-Pan-American-Grace Airways v. CAB, Nos. 18671, 18672, D.C. Cir., Oct. 30,
p. 15.
Brief for Respondent, p. 8.
Braniff-Pan-American-Grace Airways v. CAB, Nos. 18671, 18672, D.C. Cir., Oct. 30,
p. 16.
Id. at 17-18.
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similar tactics on the part of foreign governments. Perhaps this possibility really
deserves to be the controlling factor; nevertheless, if given such a role, practical
expediency replaces the notion of essential fairness that first gave rise to the Ashbacker requirement. It must be noted that this case was an example of unusually
lengthy and complicated investigations; it was not a commonplace instance of competing applications. Prior to the initiation of the South American investigation,
there had been no extensive review of South American traffic patterns since 1946.34

Because of this unusual fact, delay was unavoidable until all the evidence concerning the South American routes was made available at the completion of the investigation. If a truly objective analysis of the competing applications were to be made,
it seems reasonable that both the evidence from the investigations and the policy
considerations would be necessary.
As a result of this unusual situation, it perhaps would be advisable before
similar Ashbacker requests are denied that an intensive study be made of the usual
time-loss that the granting of a consolidated hearing would necessitate; if the average is not great, the statistics would obviate much of the persuasiveness of the
majority opinion. If, however, such delay were found to be excessive, the proper
approach would seem to be Congressional or agency attempts to simplify agency
procedure.
Permitting a consolidated hearing in this type of case has the decided advantage of giving the full benefit of all the evidence to the President. By so doing, the
fact-finding and treaty interpretation powers would return to the hands of the
President and the Congressional agency where they may be best employed, rather
than leaving to the courts the duty of balancing without adequate data the significance of international obligations against complex economic considerations.
Richard E. Steinbronn
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ATTORNEY GENERAL DOES

NOT HAVE EXCLUSIE STANDING To ENFORCE CHARITABLE TRUSTS - The College
of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons' articles of incorporation stated its charitable
purpose as the teaching of osteopathic medicine and subjects relating to health
maintenance. A majority of the corporation's trustees, defendants in the instant
case, desired to include allopathic 2 courses in its curriculum. The college, at the
direction of defendants, applied to the Association of American Medical Colleges
for membership and to the American Medical Association for approval as an allopathic medical school. Plaintiffs, minority trustees, alleged that defendants acted
pursuant to an entente fashioned by the California Medical Association and the
California Osteopathic Association by the terms of which "Osteopathic" would be
eliminated from the corporation's name, the allopathic curriculum would be estab34
1

Brief for Petitioner Braniff, p. 9.
A system of treatment based on the theory that diseases are mainly due

to deranged mechanism of bones, nerves, blood vessels, etc., and that the

condition can be remedied by manipulating organs and tissues. The American Osteopathic Association gives this definition: "That system of healing
art which places the chief emphasis on the structural integrity of the body
mechanism as being the most important single factor to maintain the wellbeing of the organism in health and disease." Maloy, THE SIMPLIFIED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS

429 (2d ed. 1951).

2 Allopathy, An incorrect designation for the regular system of medicine and surgery,
Maloy, supra note 1 at 27; "A system of medical practice that aims to combat disease by use
of remedies producing effects different from those produced by the special disease treated; a
system of medical practice making use of all measures that have proved of value in the treat-

ment of disease."
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lished, and the abolition of divergent theories of medicine in California would be
promoted. Because the college purported to be an osteopathic medical school and
solicited funds for that purpose, a minority of its trustees sued to enjoin an alleged
breach of trust under which the college held its funds. They also requested declaratory relief to determine the corporation's charitable purpose s and to establish the
trustees' rights and duties in relation to that purpose. The attorney general refused
to grant "relator status" to the plaintiffs and denied consent to bring the action.
The plaintiffs responded by making the attorney general a party defendant. As a
defense he pointed to a prior determination that the proposed changes would not
be detrimental to the public interest and that he has the exclusive power to enforce
charitable trusts. Therefore, he and the defendants claimed that plaintiffs did not
have standing. Overruling a ten-year-old precedent,4 the California Supreme
Court held: The attorney general does not have the exclusive right to enforce charitable trusts. Therefore, minority trustees have standing to enforce the corporation's
charitable trust against a co-trustee. Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and
Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932 (1964).
The main issues in Holt were (1) the sufficiency of the complaint; (2) the
plaintiffs' status as trustees or employees; and (3) the exclusiveness of the attorney
general's enforcement power. Underlying these issues is the subtle problem of striking a workable balance between increased supervision of charitable corporation
trustees and the increased utility of the corporate form for administration of funds
for charitable purposes.
The college's articles of incorporation state its purpose as:
To establish, maintain, carry on and conduct an osteopathic medical
and surgical college, in which all branches of learning, and instruction which
now pertain or which may in the future pertain to the science and art of
health maintenance; prevention, relief and recovery from disease, as well as
any or all academic subjects
desirable or necessary as a foundation for the
teaching of such branches. 5

The plaintiffs contended that the addition of allopathy to the curriculum, the elimination of "Osteopathic" from the college's name, and the promotion of a uniform
system of medicine would defeat the charitable purpose of the college. The defendants adroitly argued that the provision allowing the college to teach "all
branches of learning, and instruction which now pertain or which may in the future
pertain to the science and art of health maintenance . . .- 6was broad enough to
permit the teaching of allopathy. Further, the differences between osteopathy and

allopathy were insignificant and did not not warrant a breach of trust charge.
Avoiding these contentions, the Court stated that the main purpose of the college
was to teach osteopathy, and the latter contentions went either to the merits of the

issues or the veracity of the complaint, but not to its sufficiency. In deciding that
the complaint was sufficient, the Court stated that the incompatibility of the two
theories of medicine presented "a question of fact that cannot be decided on
demurrer. ' 7

This holding is basically correct since the primary purpose with intentional redundancy -

perhaps stated

was to "maintain, carry on and conduct an osteo-

pathic medical and surgical college" not simply a medical college. However, the
articles could be construed as defendants suggested in view of the specific direction
to teach "all branches of learning" including those a "future" generation may deem
3 "Charitable purposes include (a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental or
municipal purposes; (f) other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the
community." RESTATEMENT, SECOND, TRUSTS § 368 (1959).
4 George Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 271 P.2d 600
(1954).
5 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932,
937 (1964).
6 Ibid.
7 Id. at 938-39.
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pertinent to the "science and art of health maintenance." This recognition of the
dynamism of the physical sciences arguably should not be ignored by a Court ostensibly committed to the effectuation of the settlor's purpose. Surely, the result would
have been different were we dealing with a similar directive to maintain a college
devoted to the science of alchemy,8 but granting the trustees permission to teach
such learning as in the "future" may be pertinent to the "science and art of health

maintenance."
Moreover, a Court, more sensitive to the continuing changes in medical theory,
would possibly have found the complaint insufficient if it interpreted the selection
of a corporate form as relevant to the nature and scope of the charitable purpose.
It is likely that the corporate form was selected precisely because the teaching of all
branches of present and future medical knowledge requires the flexibility of administration normally available to charitable corporation trustees. 9 This flexibility stems
from the ease with which most articles of incorporation can be amended, and from
the great discretion accorded to corporate directors (and, by analogy, to trustees of
a charitable corporation) by the "business judgment" rule."0
Given the Court's predilection in favoring trust law, it is not surprising that
defendants' attempted distinction between trustees of a charitable trust and employees of a charitable corporation was rejected.
The right to amend the corporate charter to establish a new charitable purpose
has led to the adoption of the charitable corporation or foundation as the predominant mode of charitable trust."1 The ordinary charitable trust frequently fails where
the charitable purpose becomes either impossible or impracticable to attain. The
limitations on the doctrine of cy pres, which only permit change of charitable
purposes under some circumstances, cannot totally prevent inflexibility and obsolete
trusts.' 2 A charitable corporation, however, in addition to its charter amendment
powers, derives flexibility from its power to use such broad language in the articles
of incorporation as for "the welfare of mankind." 3 This freedom can lead to abuses
of discretion,' 4 but these may be controlled by adequate supervision of charitable
trustees. Holt apparently favors the trust aspects of the charitable corporation, a
hybrid of trust and corporation,-to the detriment of the corporate form. 5
The defendants admitted that one co-trustee can sue another to enforce the
charitable trust,' 6 but contended that members of the governing board of a charitable corporation could not sue each other because the charitable corporation is
the sole trustee and the governing board of "trustees" are mere employees. The
Court noted that by statute the powers of a charitable corporation are vested in a
"board of trustees."' 7 This designation is appropriate, the Court said, because board
directors, like ordinary trustees of a charitable trust, "are the ones solely responsible for
8 "Alchemy, A science of medieval times the object of which was to change baser metals
into gold; to discover a universal cure of diseases; and to prolong life indefinitely. A few important discoveries were made by alchemists that formed a foundation for modem chemistry."
Maloy, supra note 1 at 25.
9 Note, 64 HAv. L. REv. 1168 (1951); Taylor, PUBLIc AccouNTABILITY OF FouNDATIONS AND CHARTABLE TRUSTS at p. 21 (1953); Fremont-Smith, Regulating CharitableTrusts,
103

TRUSTS

& ESTATES 845 (1964).

10 Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfilled State Responsibility, 73
HA v.L.REv.433, 462 (1960).
11 See note 9 supra.
12 Fisch, THE Cy PREs DoOTua IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1950).
13

Note, supra note 9 at 1169.

Taylor, op. cit. supra note 9 at 21, 60.
"It was to be expected that the law applied to the charitable corporation, being the
product of transition from the trust to the corporate form, might absorb elements of both. ..
Note, supra note 9 at 1168.
16 RESTATEMENT,SEcoND, TRUSTS § 391 (1959); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 391 (2d ed. 1956).
See also Richards v.Mdkiff, 396 P.2d 49 (Hawaii 1965) which stated the general rule that cotrustees have standing but denied the suit because of insufficient facts to have an issue of breach
of trust.
17 CAL.CORP. CODE § 10205.
14
15
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administering the trust assets . . . they are fiduciaries in performing their trust

duties."' 8
Generally, the same rules that are applicable to charitable trusts are applicable
to charitable corporations; for example, cy pres is applicable to both. However,
distinctions do exist. Unlike ordinary trustees, those of a charitable corporation do
not hold legal title to the corporate funds, but rather title is held by the corporation. Further, corporate trustees are not individually liable for corporate liabilities,
contrary to the normal rule for trustees.19 It has even been suggested that corporate
charitable trustees are entitled to the benefit of a "business judgment" rule of a kind
enjoyed by their counterparts in the private corporation. 0
Whether the charitable corporation holds donations in trust or by absolute gift
is a debated issue. Where the donor imposes restrictions on the use of funds, it is
held that a charitable trust is in effect. But,
it is sometimes held that the donation
21
was an absolute gift and not one in trust.

In the instant case it is noteworthy that apparently the donors did not attach
restrictions to their gifts. One has the impression that the Court is seeking to protect these donors as a class but it does not appear that their interests coincide with
those of the minority trustees. The latter seek to maintain the status quo under a
conservative interpretation of the articles of incorporation. The former sought
merely to make a gift - not knowing and not caring22 what use the articles of incorporation would permit the board members to direct.

Still, it is obvious that most donors would be aggrieved to discover that their
contributions had been used for purposes entirely divorced from the operation of a
medical school. To this extent the Court's unwillingness to classify board members
as mere employees is justified.
Since both corporate and noncorporate charitable trustees are in a fiduciary
capacity and have the sole responsibility for administering charitable funds, they
both should be held to high standards in dealing with those funds. 2

Even in the

private corporation, the standards are such that directors may sue co-directors to
enforce the corporate charter.24 There should be no distinction caused by the charitable nature of the corporation. Though there is some doubt that the alleged
activities were actually ultra vires, the Court reached the correct decision on the
"fiduciary" issue, because the difference is only one of terminology and the similarity
between their
fiduciary duties means that they possess the same rights of
2
enforcement.
Granting such equality of enforcement rights, the minority trustees of the
college would yet have been defeated were they not able to persuade the Court to
depart from the Pepperdine2 6 precedent. That case had given the enforcement
responsibility exclusively to the attorney general. In overcoming this judicially
created roadblock, the plaintiffs still had to meet a statutory challenge to their
standing. The argument based on the statute was offered by the dissenting judge.
The provisions of the General Corporation Law (Corp. Code, §§
1-8999) are made applicable to corporations formed under General Non18 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932,
937 (1964).
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 940 n. 1.
21 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, TRUSTS § 348 (1959); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 348.1 (2d ed.
1956); Comment, 26 So. CAL. L. REv. 80, 81 (1952); Note, supra note 9 at 1171-73; Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation& the Charitable Trust, 24 WASH. U.L.Q. 1-7 (1938).
22 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932,
935-36 (1964).
23 Id. at 937.
24 Id. at 940 n. 2.
25 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, TRUSTS § 348, comment f (1959); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS §
348.1 (2d ed. 1956).
26 George Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal. App. 2d 154, 271 P.2d 600
(1954).
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profit Corporation.Law (Corp. Code, §§ 9000-10703) except as to matters
specifically otherwise provided for (Corp. for
Code,
9002).
the
of the officers
acts However,
ultra§ vires
matter of who is entitled to bring an action
or directors of a charitable corporation is "specifically otherwise provided
for" by section 10207 of the Corporations Code. Therefore, no action may
be filed under section27 803 of the Corporations Code with respect to a
charitable corporation.

The dissent ignores both the failure of California law to designate the exclusiveness or the nonexclusiveness of the attorney general's power of enforcement and
the trust aspects of a charitable corporation.
Unrestricted standing may lead to harassment of charitable trustees with a
consequent waste of funds intended for charitable purposes, while restricted standing
may result in virtually no trust enforcement with the same potential loss of trust
funds. Further, restricted standing can aid in the continued breach of trust by
charitable trustees. 28 Illinois, like California, had precedent that the attorney general's power to enforce charitable trusts is exclusive.2 9 Thus abuses of the kind
found in the infamous Ferguson Monument Case0 could be corrected only if the
attorney general was disposed to act. In that case collusion between the attorney
general, the trustees and the judge operated to divert trust income for over 30 years to
the treasury of a private corporation. 31 Ultimately a law review expos632 led to correction of the abuse and the adoption of charitable trust enforcement legislation in
Illinois.s
Since the beneficiaries of a charitable trust are indefinite and usually unascertainable, they cannot protect their interests. The rationale behind the attorney
general's enforcement power over charitable trusts is his representation of the public,
the beneficiaries of all charitable trusts. 3 4 The exclusiveness of the attorney general's

right to enforce should depend on the state of trust enforcement. "Every writer
upon the subject concurs that in the United States as a whole the administrative
machinery is inadequate for supervising and enforcing the duties of custodians of
charitable funds." 35
England's attorney general enforced charitable trusts before the adoption of
the Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601.21 From 1601-1853 legislation was passed to
aid in the investigation of trusts and to modernize enforcement procedure.3 7 The
present English system is based on the Charitable Trust Act of 185331 which established a Board of Charitable Commissioners to investigate, enforce, and regulate
charitable trusts as well as to revamp obsolete trusts by cy pres. Periodic reporting
was added by an 1855 amendment.2 9 Lord Nathan's Committee in 1952 urged
27 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932,
940 (1964).
28 Kutner, The Desecration of the Ferguson Monument Trust: The Need for Watchdog
Legislation, 12 D. PAUL L. Rav. 217, 222-26 (1963).
29 People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson, 327 Ill. App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 794 (1945).
30 Art Institute v. Kerner, Case No. B269011, Cir. Ct. Cook County (May 22, 1933);
Kutner, supra note 28, at 219.
31 "At 10:02 a.m. the Art Institute filed a complaint.... At 10:04 a.m. on the same day
the Attorney General's Answer was filed, making only a nominal defense and conceding all the
points raised by the Art Institute.... If these facts were not indicia enough of collusion, it was
subsequently discovered that the Art Institute's Complaint, the Attorney General's Answer, and
the court's decree were all typed on the same typewriter.... ." Kutner, supra note 28, at 219-20.
32 Id. at 235-36.
33 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 51-64 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
34 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932,
935 (1964).
35 Alford, The Disposition of Assets Upon Failure of a Charitable Trust or Corporation:
Policy Relationship to Enforcement of Charities,9 UTAH L. REv. 217, 218 (1964).
36 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 391 (2d ed. 1956).
37 The Charities Procedure Act, 52 Geo. III, c. 101 (1812); Charitable Donations Registration Act, 52 Geo. III, c. 102 (1812); Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities,52 MicH. L. REv. 633, 636-39 (1954).
38 16 & 17 Vict., c. 137 (1853); Bogert, supra note 37, at 637.
39 18 & 19 Vict., c. 124, § 44 (1855); Bogert, supra note 37, at 637-38.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
continuation of the Board of Charitable Commissioners, expanded registration, and
the imposition of fines for failure to register or to file periodic reports with the
Board. 40 The British system provides an efficient tool of enforcement, a feature
conspicuously - and almost traditionally - lacking in the United States.
Until 1943 there was no effective statutory enforcement in this country. This
left enforcement in the hands of the overworked attorney general. 41 A lack of public
interest in charitable trust enforcement, and inadequate funds for this purpose, left
enforcement virtually at a standstill. 42 New Hampshire in 1943 was the first state
to adopt efficient enforcement legislation.43 This act required registration of charitable trusts, and the filing of annual reports by charitable trustees. The results
were astounding. Charitable trusts which were dormant for years were reactivated
and for the first time the attorney general became cognizant of virtually unknown
trusts and their operation. 44 This knowledge is a prerequisite for effective
enforcement.
Recently four states,45 including California, have adopted the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act which was promulgated by the
Commissioners for Uniform Acts in 1954. The Uniform Act establishes a public
registry, trustee reporting requirements,
and other provisions useful to the enforce4
ment of the charitable trusts.
Both the New Hampshire Act and the Uniform Act exclude charitable corporations from their scope. While California's Uniform Act does apply to charitable corporations, it does exclude religious and educational corporations.4 7 Even
if the Uniform Act were applicable, both it and the California Corporate Code
would not settle the standing issue for they merely state that the
attorney general
48
shall enforce without designating the exclusiveness of this power.
The Holt resolution of the "standing" issue has within it the potential for increased harassment of trustees. One way to prevent this is to require a posting of
bond at the time of suit as is done in stockholders' derivative suits. 49 The thought

40 Bogert, supra note 37, at 638-39.
41 Id. at 639; Alford, supra note 35, at 220. Even today it is suggested that the states' lack
of effective charitable trust enforcement machinery may lead to federal legislation which would
usurp this state power, for Congress has become increasingly concerned with abuses in this area.
D'Amours, State Supervision of Charities: Present Status, 4 N. H. BAR J. 76, 88-93 (1962);
Fremont-Smith, supra note 9 at 849. There is also talk of creating a national registry for charitable trusts, corporations, and foundations. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 9 at 136. There are
advantages to centralization that can be accomplished on the state level, that is, the elimination of duplicate reports to the county, city and state governments, while at the same time adding stability to trust enforcement through the expertise of the board. Karst, supra note 10, at
476-83.
42
American legislators are more apt to give men credit for honesty; and
they rely not a little on personal interest for the execution of the laws. When
an individual is really and sensibly injured by an administrative abuse, his
personal interest is a guaranty that he will prosecute. But if a legal formality
be required, which, however advantageous to the community, is of small importance to individuals, plaintiffs may be less easily found; and thus, by a
tacit agreement, the laws may fall into disuse.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 98 (Reeve transl. 1868); Alford, supra note 35,
at 217.
43 N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 7:19, 7:21-32 (1955). Later a Director of Charitable Trusts
was added: N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 7:20 (1955). See Alford, supra note 35, at 220.
44 D'Amours, Control of Charitable Trusts, 84 TRUSTS & ESTATES 345, 346-47 (1947).
45 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12580-95; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 51-64 (Smith-Hurd 1963);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1200(1)-(16); OaR. REV. STAT. §§ 128.610-.750 (1963); Uniform
Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, §§ 1-19, 9C U.L.A. (Supp. p. 138, 1965);
Alford, supra note 35, n. 20.
46 §§ 4 & 6, 9C U.L.A. (1954); Wynn, Accountability of Trustees for Charitable Trusts,
93 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 938 (1954).
47 Fremont-Smith, supra note 9, at 847; D'Amours, supra note 41, at 80-81.
48 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9505 & 10207; CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12591. Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932, 935 (1964).
49 Karst, supranote 10, at 447.
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that the plaintiff .maylose not only the costs of his suit but the costs of the trusts'
defense as well would cure the enthusiasm of those bent on mere harassment. Another way is to require a potential litigant to have contributed a minimum amount
to the charity before he can bring suit to enforce the charitable trust.50 Holt can be
commended for adopting the prevailing rule that the attorney general does not
have exclusive standing. Co-trustees are more aware of breaches of trust and tend
to have a more direct interest at stake than the attorney general.5' However, in
instructing the attorney general that the proper test of enforceability is violation of
purpose and not detriment to the public, 52 the Court may have achieved a broader
enforcement potential at the expense of flexible and efficient operation under the
corporate form.
John A. Hauter

50 Ibid.
51 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians &Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.2d 932,
936 (1964).

52 Ibid.

